A commentary to Barth's Anthropology of knowledge: Comments by Chiu, CY
Title A commentary to Barth's Anthropology of knowledge:Comments
Author(s) Chiu, CY
Citation Current Anthropology, 2002, v. 43 n. 1, p. 11-12
Issued Date 2002
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/42602
Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
BARTH An Anthropology of Knowledge \ i i
of change is one of a marginal change—like a differential
equation of what is happening—then we can, or rather
we must, hring a hattery of those persons' presumptions
and schemas for interpreting the apparent results of ac-
tion to bear on what new knowledge may ensue. Raw
nature obtains very limited access and at best only a
small voice through this tight grid of human construc-
tions.
But perhaps some persons are as literal-minded as the
old ethnographers were and use conventional represen-
tations to think in unconventional contexts. Baktaman
cultivators sometimes wonder, as I found them doing,
whether, given that the taro can smell, it can also hear.
(It probably cannot see, because it is beneath the ground.)
Smell also plays a certain role in their ritual: they blow
wild ginger in contexts that I never felt I understood.
Perhaps odor serves as a model, an image, for action at
a distance—a problem I once heard them spontaneously
address in wondering how it was that the ancestral skull
in the temple could effect growth in the taro of distant
gardens. Change in every tradition of knowledge surely
arises from within it, through idle speculation, and by
transposing models and rriixing metaphors, as well as
from the external feedbacks from the world that are in-
terpreted in experience. Such speculation must press on
the boundaries of conventional knowledge. Can we dis-
cover and describe the specific form of the reality checks
that such speculation runs into? Surely, the very fact that
change in traditions of knowledge is demonstrably path-
dependent shows us that these human constructions are
not subject to any massively external test of nature and
that we need a much less simplistic way to model the
interpenetration of a corpus of knowledge and its set of
applications to action on the world.
To unravel more of the processes and dynamics of the
human varieties in knowledge, it seems that we have an
unending program of discovery and analysis ahead of us.
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Barth has managed a significant conceptual achievement
in proposing to develop a comparative ethnographic anal-
ysis on "how bodies of knowledge are produced in per-
sons and populations, in the context of the social rela-
tions that they sustain." In this proposal he identifies
three interconnected faces of knowledge: a substantive
corpus of assertions, a range of media of representation,
and social organization. This schematic framework of-
fers new insights on the interpersonal and cognitive
foundations of cultural meanings.
Many social psychologists have sought to identify the
interpersonal factors that determine knowledge distri-
bution, forms of coherence in shared knowledge, and the
trajectory of change in cultural meanings. I agree with
Barth that meaning construction, transmission, and ap-
plication in daily social transactions are symbolic ac-
tions that take place among socially situated persons
with particular communicative intentions. In psychol-
ogy, the preferred subject of theoretical discourse is men-
tal process. Robert Krauss and I have articulated the so-
cial cognitive processes that mediate the development
of shared meanings. Our claims (1998:53) are as follows:
Using language to represent a state of affairs can
evoke or create an internal representation that dif-
fers from the internal representations of the same
state of affairs evoked or created by other means of
encoding. The internal representations evoked or
created by language use can affect a language user's
subsequent cognitions. The form that a linguistic
representation takes will be affected by the contexts
of language use, including the ground rules and as-
sumptions that govern usage; audience design; and
the immediate, ongoing, and emerging properties of
the communication situation. Through communica-
tion, the private cognitions of individuals can be
made public and directed toward a shared represen-
tation of the referent.
These claims link the use of language in communi-
cation to the emergence of socially shared cognitions,
which are core elements of cultural meaning systems.
As Langacker (1967) argues, when a thought is translated
into a speech the speaker must cast it in a form that is
appropriate for linguistic operations and pertinent to
the communication function. Thus, interpersonal com-
munication is the primary process by which private
thoughts are socialized. Audience design in communi-
cation provides a good illustration of how a private idea
is transformed into a shared representation. Typically, a
communicative message is addressed to an actual or po-
tential audience and has been formulated to be under-
standable by that audience. Regardless of whether the
audience consists of some specific other person, a spec-
ifiable collection of individuals (students in an intro-
ductory anthropology lecture), or a category of individ-
uals (readers of CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY), in formulating
communicative messages a speaker must take the ad-
dressee's knowledge, beliefs, and motives into account.
Speakers describing the Star Ferry Terminal in Hong
Kong refer to it differently depending on the listener's
apparent familiarity with Hong Kong. Thus, inevitably
the speaker will modify the communicative message in
the direction of the assumed knowledge of the listener.
Moreover, the verbal representation of the referent in the
communicative message could overshadow the speaker's
original mental representation of the referent. Verbal
overshadowing is particularly important for internali-
zation of shared representations because it enables
shared representations established in communication to
replace private representations.
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As Barth mentions, people sharing a cultural context
are positioned in a common social organization and par-
ticipate in similar social practices. Because communi-
cative acts are goal-directed behaviors, culturally salient
perlocutionary intentions (intentions to hring ahout
some particular consequence hy an act of speaking) may
also constrain the pattern of language use within a cul-
tural group, evoking similar linguistic representations
and giving rise to shared meanings.
In short, there are different metaphors and modes of
discourse in anthropology and social psychology for de-
scribing the "processes and dynamics of the human va-
rieties in knowledge." An interdisciplinary perspective
might offer a more complete picture with different layers
of detail and generality. One facet of Barth's conceptual
accomplishment is that he offers a concrete analytic
framework for estahlishing common ground for the two
disciplines to communicate their insights on how cul-
tural meanings develop and change in interpersonal
transactions.
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While he is still best known for his early work on po-
litical leadership and ethnic identity, Fredrik Barth has
now devoted the majority of his long career to the an-
thropology of knowledge. We can detect the beginnings
of this project as early as 1966, when he wrote, "The
problem as I see it is to understand how any degree of
systematization and consistency is established and
maintained between the different values that coexist in
a culture" (1966:12). Rejecting structuralist and func-
tionalist accounts that attribute cultural integration
merely to logical or psychological consistency, Barth set
out to investigate the creation of consistency through
personal transactions and other social processes. He took
as his inspiration a statement by Boas, originally pub-
lished in 1896: "If anthropology desires to establish the
laws governing the growth of culture it must not confine
itself to comparing the results of growth alone, but when-
ever such is feasible it must compare the processes of
growth" (Boas 1940:280, emphasis added; cf. Barth 1966:
22). • - - .
Comparing processes of cultural growth is exactly
what Barth has done in New Guinea and Bali (not to
mention the several other societies in which he has con-
ducted fieldwork over the past 35 years). The resulting
monographs (Barth 1975, 1987, 1993) and articles (e.g.,
1989, 1990, 1992) constitute an exemplary body of work,
perhaps the single most important model for empirical
research within the emerging neo-Boasian paradigm (e.g.,
Rodseth 1998, Bunzl 1999, Lewis 2001). Here I would
like to focus on the Boasian metaphor of "growth" as a
way of analyzing both the scope and the limits of Barth's
anthropology of knowledge.
The concept of growth is deeply amhiguous. It col-
lapses together the notion of development, such as the
growth of trees or children, and the notion of spread,
such as the growth of an epidemic or a religious tradition.
Both kinds of phenomena may he descrihed as "growth,"
hut the first kind implies gradual change within a
bounded and persisting system (like a human body),
while the second implies more or less faithful replication
within an ever-shifting social network. When Barth in-
vestigates the growth of knowledge, which kind of
growth does he have in mind?
Taken by itself, his Mintz Lecture might lead one to
think that Barth is mainly interested in the first sense
of growth, that is, development within a system—the
system of knowledge, in this case, found within a given
society. Indeed, for present purposes, he deliberately
omits the many "exogenous factors" that he knows must
impinge upon the "systemic local processes" that he is
attempting to model. Such strategic simplification is a
necessary step—if not a necessary evil—in all model
building, and there is little douht that Barth gains in-
sights into endogenous processes by temporarily ignoring
exogenous ones. In particular, he is ahle to shed consid-
erahle light on the issues of (i) how knowledge in the
Ok region has changed and diversified, given the su-
preme value that the Baktaman place on cultural con-
tinuity, and (2) what makes Balinese knowledge persist
and cohere over such a wide area when there is no
churchlike authority to curh "erratic local innovation."
Both change and persistence are seen here as endoge-
nously determined processes, as in the growth of a tree
or a child.
Yet a careful reading of Barth's other works, especially
Cosmologies in the Making (1987) and "The Guru and
the Gonjurer" (1990), makes it clear that he is intensely
interested in cultural growth as a distributed process—a
matter of knowledge spreading from individual to indi-
vidual within a social network and perhaps spilling from
one network to another through the activities of "gurus"
and other long-distance travelers. To balance our image
of Barth's approach, it is worth remembering his em-
phasis in an earlier context on the way knowledge often
slips the grid of existing institutions: "I wish to grasp
general features of the management and transmission of
knowledge, and the resulting informational economy of
communities and regions, not the structure of particular
instituted relations" (1990:648). A related aspect of
Barth's approaches his emphasis on the factors that make
some forms of knowledge more "portable" or more
"catching" than others (see also Sperher 1996). In the
Mintz Lecture we see how a corpus of knowledge is de-
pendent on endogenous media and social organization,-
what we do not see in any detail is how a given idea or
assertion escapes that corpus of knowledge and spreads
beyond its original medium and social milieu. The lim-
itation of this approach has been identified hy Barth him-
self (1990:641), and the question he posed in that earlier
context is especially fitting for an occasion honoring Sid-
ney Mintz: "How might we do hetter, and start building
a social anthropology which could inform regional and
historical syntheses, and therehy achieve the dynamic

